Entropy Source and DRNG Manager ...or /dev/random in User Space

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Agenda

- ESDM Goals
- ESDM Design
- Initial Seeding Strategies
- Entropy Sources


ESDM Goals

- Full user space implementation
 - No kernel changes needed only if scheduler ES is requested
 - Independent of political games of developers
- API and ABI compliant drop-in replacement of Linux /dev/random, /dev/urandom and getrandom(2)
- Minimal dependencies on environment
 - Protobuf-c
 - FUSE / CUSE support
- Runs fully unprivileged
- Sole use of cryptography for data processing
- Flexible configuration supporting wide range of use cases
- Standards compliance: SP800-90A/B/C, AIS 20/31, FIPS IG 7.19 / D.K (use of DRBG as conditioner)

\$ ps -efa	grep es	dm		
root	891	1	2 23:34 ?	00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/ esdm -server -f
nobody	939	891	0 23:34 ?	00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/ esdm -server -f
nobody	1050	1	0 23:34 ?	00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/ esdm -cuse-random -f
nobody	1051	1	0 23:34 ?	00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/ esdm -cuse-urandom -f
nobody	1054	1	0 23:34 ?	00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/ esdm -procrelabel -f -o allow other /proc/sys/kernel/random

ESDM Design


- 7 Entropy Sources
 - 5 external
 - 2 internal
 - All ES treated equally
 - No domination by any ES seeding triggered by initialization process or DRNG
- All ES can be selectively disabled at compile time
- ES data fed into DRNG
- DRNG accessible with APIs



ESDM Components

ESDM Server

- Using ESDM library
- Offering RPC Interface
- Protobuf-C RPC
- Sensitive operations require privilege
- ESDM RPC library
 - API for other clients
- /dev/random CUSE
- /dev/urandom CUSE
- /proc/sys/kernel/random FUSE
- libesdm-getrandom.so



DRNG Output APIs

- Blocking APIs deliver data only after fully initialized and fully seeded
 - When Linux compliant interfaces enabled:
 - /dev/random
 - getrandom() system call
- Prediction Resistance API deliver data only after fully initialized and successful reseed returning at most data equal to the amount of entropy
 - ESDM RPC client API
 - Using /dev/random with O_SYNC
 - Using getrandom(2) with flag GRND_RANDOM
 - Compliant with:
 - FIPS IG 7.19 / D.K to use DRBG as conditioning component for seeding other DRBGs
 - German AIS 20/31 (2011 and draft 2022) NTG.1 requirements
- Get seed: getrandom(2) with flag GRND_SEED to obtain data from entropy sources directly
- All other APIs deliver data without blocking until complete initialization
 - No guarantee of ESDM being fully initialized / seeded

DRNG Seeding

- Temporary seed buffer: concatenation of output from all ES
- Seeding during initialization: when 256 bits of entropy are available
- Seeding at runtime
 - After 2²⁰ generate requests or 10 minutes
 - After forced reseed by user space
 - After new DRNG is loaded
 - At least 128 bits (SP800-90C mode: ESDM security strength) of total entropy must be available
 - 256 bits of entropy requested from each ES ES may deliver less
 - Seed operation occurs when DRNG is requested to produce random bits
 - DRNG returns to not fully seeded when last seed with full entropy was > 2³⁰ generate operations ago

ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_seed_work_one:361]: reseed triggered by system events for DRNG on NUMA node 1
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es jent.c:esdm jent get:122]: obtained 256 bits of entropy from Jitter RNG noise source
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es_cpu.c:esdm cpu get:230]: obtained 8 bits of entropy from CPU RNG entropy source
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm_es_krng.c:esdm_krng_get:243]: obtained 128 bits of entropy from kernel RNG noise source
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm_es_aux.c:esdm_aux_get_pool:319]: obtained 0 bits by collecting 0 bits of entropy from aux pool, 0 bits of entropy remaining
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:280]: seeding regular DRNG with 272 bytes
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:294]: regular DRNG stats since last seeding: 0 secs; generate calls: 0
ESDM	(22:00:20)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm/drng/mgr.c:esdm/drng/inject:310]: regular DRNG fully seeded

ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Warning - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es sched.c.esdm sched initialize:140]: Disabling scheduler-based entropy source which is not present in kernel
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es mgr.c:esdm es mgr initialize:397]: Initialize ES JitterRNG
		(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es jent.c:esdm jent initialize:53]: Jitter RNG working on current system
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm drng mgr.c:esdm drng force reseed:433]: force reseed of initial DRNG
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm drng mgr.c:esdm drng seed work one:361]: reseed triggered by system events for DRNG on NUMA node 0
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es jent.c:esdm jent get:122]: obtained 256 bits of entropy from Jitter RNG noise source
		(esdm-server) Debug [/esdm/es cpu/cpu random x86.h:cpu es x86 rdseed:98]: RDSEED support detected
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm_es_cpu.c:esdm_cpu_multiplier:180]: Setting CPU ES multiplier to 1
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es cpu.c:esdm cpu get:230]: obtained 8 bits of entropy from CPU RNG entropy source
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es krng.c:esdm krng get:243]: obtained 128 bits of entropy from kernel RNG noise source
		(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm drng mgr.c:esdm drng inject:280]: seeding regular DRNG with 272 bytes
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm drng mgr.c:esdm drng inject:294]: regular DRNG stats since last seeding: 0 secs; generate calls: 0
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [/esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:310]: regular DRNG fully seeded
		(esdm-server) Verbose - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm es mgr.c:esdm set_operational:250]: ESDM fully operational
ESDM	(23:25:57)	(esdm-server) Verbose - Entropy Source [/esdm/esdm_es_mgr.c:esdm_init_ops:355]: ESDM fully seeded with 392 bits of entropy

Initial Seeding Strategy I Default Operation

- DRNG is fully seeded with 256 bits of entropy
- Blocking interfaces released after DRNG is fully seeded
 - After 5 requests received, forced seeding with available entropy to achieve fully seeded level
- Default applied
 - Either no specific seeding strategy compiled
 - Or specific seeding strategy is not enabled at start time

Initial Seeding Strategy II Entropy Source Oversampling

- Fully seeded step changed
- Compile time option
 - Function only enabled in FIPS mode
 - Function only enabled if message digest of conditioner >= 384 bits
- Initial conditioning: s + 64 bit
- Initial DRNG seeding: every entropy source requested for s + 128 bits
 - Every ES alone could provide all required entropy
- · All ES data concatenated into seed buffer
- Runtime debug mode: display of all processing steps
- SP800-90C compliance:
 - SP800-90A DRBG with 256-bit strength / SHA-512 vetted conditioning component
 - Complies with RBG2(NP) per default
 - Can be configured to provide RBG2(P)
- Can be used in parallel with seeding strategy III

If enabled, the ESDM <mark>oversam</mark>ples the entropy sources compliant to SP800-90C. The <mark>oversam</mark>pling is applied in FIPS-enabled mode only.

The following oversampling is applied:

Seed the DRNG with 128 more bits of entropy from the conditioning component. Inject 64 more bits of entropy from the noise source into the conditioning component.

Initial Seeding Strategy III Two Entropy Sources

- Initial / minimal seeding steps apply unaltered fully seeded step changed
- Compile time option
 - Function only enabled with compile option "ais2031"
- Initial DRNG seeding: two entropy sources must deliver 220 bits of entropy each
- All ES data concatenated into seed buffer
- Runtime debug mode: display of all processing steps
- German AIS 20/31 compliance
 - Caveat: Applies to draft version of AIS20/31 as of September 2022
 - NTG.1: LRNG configuration ensures two entropy sources can reach at least 220 bits each
 - PTG.3 / DRG.4: LRNG can be configured to provide a PTG.3 or DRG.4
- Can be used in parallel with seeding strategy II

When enabling this option, two entropy sources must deliver 220 bits of entropy each to consider a DRNG as fully seeded. Any two entropy sources can be used to fulfill this requirement. If specific entropy sources shall not be capable of contributing to this seeding strategy, the respective entropy source must be configured to provide less than 220 bits of entropy.

The strategy is consistent with the requirements for NTG.1 compliance in German AIS 20/31 draft from 2022 and is only enforced with lrng_es_mgr.ntg1=1.


Compliance with German AIS 20/31 from 2011 is always present when using /dev/random with the flag O_SYNC or getrandom(2) with GRND_RANDOM.

DRNG Management

- One DRNG per CPU up to maximum of 64
- Hash contexts on stack only
- Each DRNG initializes from entropy sources
- Sequential initialization of DRNG first is CPU 0
- If one DRNG node is not yet fully seeded → use of DRNG(Node 0)
- Each DRNG instance managed independently
- To prevent reseed storm reseed threshold different for each node
 - Node 0: 600 seconds
 - Node 1: 700 seconds

- ...

• Maximum node number is compile time option



<pre># Option for: THREADING_MAX_THREADS option('threading_max_threads', type: 'integer', min: 1, value: 64,</pre>
This value can be set to any arbitrary number. Depending on the number of threads, the required numbers of thread contexts are statically allocated.
The number of threads define:
* the number of concurrent DRNG instances that are maintained independent of each other - this value is limited by the number of found CPUs as it makes no sense to have more DRNG instances than CPUs that can execute them.
There is no other value that needs changing if the number of threads shall be adjusted.
The value must not be lower than 1. ''')

Data Processing Primitives


- Sole use of cryptographic mechanisms for data compression
- Cryptographic primitives compile-time switchable
 - DRNG, Conditioning hash
 - Built-in: SP800-90A Hash DRBG SHA2-512 / SHA2-512
 - Available Crypto-providers: OpenSSL, Botan, leancrypto
- Complete built-in cryptographic primitive testing available
 - Full ACVP test harness available: https://github.com/smuellerDD/acvpparser
 - ChaCha20 DRNG userspace implementation: https://github.com/smuellerDD/leancrypto
- Other data processing primitives
 - Concatenation of data
 - Truncation of message digest to heuristic entropy value
- Entropy behavior of all data processing primitives based on fully understood and uncontended operations

######################################
Option for: ESDM_DRNG_HASH_DRBG option('drng_hash_drbg', type: 'feature', value: 'enabled', description:'''SP800-90A Hash Deterministic Random Number Generator.
This configuration enables an SP800-90A Hash DRBG with SHA-512 core without prediction resistance. ''')
<pre>option('drng_chacha20', type: 'feature', value: 'disabled',</pre>
option ('hash_sha512', type: 'feature', value: 'enabled', description: 'Enable SHA2-512 conditioning hash')
<pre>option('hash sha3 512', type: 'feature', value: 'disabled',</pre>

description: 'Enable SHA3-512 conditioning hash

External Entropy Sources

- Use without additional conditioning fast source
 - Jitter RNG
 - Kernel RNG
 - CPU (e.g. Intel RDSEED, POWER DARN, RISC-V CSRRW, IBM Z PRNO)
 - Proper oversampling as defined by specification
 - Data immediately available when ESDM requests it
- Additional conditioning slow source
 - RNGDs
 - Arbitrary writers to /dev/random
 - All received data added to "auxiliary pool" with hash update operation
 - Data "trickles in" over time
- Every entropy source has individual entropy estimate
 - Taken at face value each ES requires its own entropy assessment




Mean Duration in Cycles for one IRQ

Internal ES:

Interrupts

- Interrupt timing
 - All interrupts are treated as one entropy source
- Data collection executed in IRQ context
- Data compression executed partially in IRQ and process context
- Data compression is a hash update operation
- High performance: up to twice as fast as legacy /dev/random in IRQ context with continuous enabled
 - Even faster without continuous compression
- Kernel RNG lost acces to its primary IRQ ES \rightarrow ESDM reseeds kernel RNG periodically
- Requires small kernel patch + kernel module
 - Code present in ESDM source tree



Internal ES: IRQ **Data Processing**

- 8 LSB of time stamp divided by GCD concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
 - Entropy estimate
 - Health test
- 32 bits of other event data concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
- When array full \rightarrow conditioned into per-CPU entropy pool
 - When entropy is required \rightarrow conditioning of all entropy pools into one message digest


IRO Context CPU 0

Process Contex

IRO Context

else

- Addition of all per-CPU entropy estimates





Internal ES: Scheduler Events

- Scheduler-based context switch timing
 - All context switches are treated as one entropy source
- Data collection executed in scheduler context
 - Collection: adding data into collection array \rightarrow high-performance (couple of cycles)
- Data compression executed in process context during reseeding of DRNG
- Data compression is a hash operation
- Requires small kernel patch + kernel module
 - Code present in ESDM source tree

Internal ES: Scheduler Data Processing

- 8 LSB of time stamp divided by GCD concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
 - Entropy estimate
 - Health test
- When array full \rightarrow overwriting of oldest value
- When entropy is required → conditioning of all entropy pools into one message digest
 - Addition of all per-CPU entropy estimates





Internal ES Testing Interfaces

- Testing code is compile time option
- Access via DebugFS
- Testing supports data collection at boot time and runtime:
 - Raw unprocessed entropy time stamps for Scheduler / IRQ ES
 - Performance data for ESDM's Scheduler handler
 - Performance data for ESDM's IRQ handler
- Scheduler ES: Full SP800-90B assessment documentation yet pending
- IRQ ES: Full SP800-90B assessment available
- Raw entropy collection and analysis tools provided

Test System	Entropy of	Sufficient
0	1,000,000 Traces	Entropy
ARMv7 rev 5	1.9344	Y
ARMv7 rev 5	7.07088	Y
$(\text{Freescale i.MX53})^{22}$		
ARMv7 rev 5	6.638399	Y
(Freescale i.MX6 Ultralite) ²³		
ARM 64 bit AppliedMicro X-Gene	5.599128	Y
Mustang Board		
Intel Atom Z530 – using GUI	3.38584	Y
Intel i7 7500U Skylake - 64-bit KVM	3.452064	Y
environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake – 64-bit	7.400136	Y
KVM environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake – 32-bit	7.405704	Y
KVM environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake	6.871	Y
Intel Xeon Gold 6234	4.434168	Y
IBM POWER 8 LE 8286-42A	6.830712	Y
IBM POWER 7 BE 8202-E4C	4.233912	Y
IBM System Z z13 (machine 2964)	4.366368	Y
IBM System Z z15 (machine 8561)	5.691832	Y
MIPS Atheros AR7241 rev 1 ²⁴	7.157064	Y
MIPS Lantiq 34Kc V5.6 ²⁵	7.032740	Y
Qualcomm IPQ4019 ARMv7 ²⁶	6.638405	Y
SiFive HiFive Unmatched RISC-V U74	2.387470	Y

Internal ES Health Test

- Health test compile-time configurable
- Power-Up self tests
 - All cryptographic mechanisms
 - Time stamp management
- APT / RCT
- Time-Stamp Pattern detection: 1st/2nd/3rd discrete derivative of time ≠ 0
- Blocking interface: Wait until APT power-up testing complete
- Provides SP800-90B compliance of internal ES

General Testing

- Automated regression test suite covering the different options of ESDM
 - Meson test harness
- Applied testing frameworks
 - ASAN: address, thread, undefined
 - Valgrind memory leak detector
 - clang-scan
- Performance tests of DRNG
- Interface validation testing
- Compile test testing all options

ninja: Entering directory `/home/sm/tmp/esdm-0.3.0/H ninja: no work to do.	build'	
1/52 SHA256	ок	0.01
2/52 SHA512	OK	0.01
3/52 HMAC SHA256	ОК	0.01
4/52 HMAC SHA512	ОК	0.01
5/52 Hash DRBG SHA512	OK	0.00
6/52 IOCTL RNDADDENTROPY /dev/random 7/52 IOCTL RNDADDENTROPY /dev/urandom	OK OK	3.01 3.01
8/52 IOCTL RNDCLEARPOOL /dev/random	OK	3.11
9/52 IOCTL RNDCLEARPOOL /dev/urandom	OK	3.11
10/52 IOCTL RNDGETENTCNT /dev/random 11/52 IOCTL RNDGETENTCNT /dev/urandom	OK	3.01
	ОК	3.01
12/52 IOCTL RNDRESEEDCRNG /dev/random	OK	3.02
13/52 IOCTL RNDRESEEDCRNG /dev/urandom	OK	3.01
14/52 IOCTL RNDADDTOENTCNT /dev/random 15/52 IOCTL RNDADDTOENTCNT /dev/urandom	OK OK	3.01 3.01
16/52 IOCTL get info /dev/random	OK OK	3.01
17/52 IOCTL get info /dev/urandom	OK	3.01
18/52 Poll writer FD /dev/random	OK	5.02
18/52 Poll writer FD /dev/random 19/52 Poll writer FD /dev/urandom	ОК	5.02
20/52 Read /dev/random	ок	3.18
21/52 Read /dev/urandom	OK	3.23
22/52 Write /dev/random	OK OK	3.45
23/52 Write /dev/urandom 24/52 Read /dev/random - w/o ESDM server	OK	3.45 3.55
25/52 Read /dev/urandom - w/o ESDM server	OK	3.56
26/52 Write /dev/random - w/o ESDM server	OK	3.56
27/52 Write /dev/urandom - w/o ESDM server	OK	3.56
28/52 ES CPU	OK	0.03
29/52 ES Kernel	OK	0.03
30/52 ES Scheduler	OK	0.02
31/52 ESDM API call esdm_status 32/52 ESDM API call esdm_version	OK OK	0.07
33/52 ESDM API call esdm_version 33/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes full	OK	0.09
34/52 ESDM API call esdm_get_random_bytes_	OK	0.20
35/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes min	OK	0.27
36/52 ES Jitter RNG	OK	1.89
37/52 ESDM DRNG manager max w/o reseed - 1 DRNG	ОК	1.03
38/52 ESDM DRNG manager max w/o reseed - 2 DRNG	OK	1.03
39/52 ESDM seed entropy - all ES, no FIPS	OK OK	1.07
40/52 ESDM seed entropy - all ES, FIPS 41/52 ESDM seed entropy - JENT ES, no FIPS	OK	1.09
42/52 ESDM seed entropy - JENT ES, FIPS	OK	1.00
43/52 ESDM seed entropy - CPU ES, no FIPS	OK	1.07
44/52 ESDM seed entropy - CPU ES, FIPS	ОК	1.09
45/52 ESDM seed entropy - KRNG ES, no FIPS	OK	1.06
46/52 ESDM seed entropy - Sched ES, no FIPS	SKIP	0.13
exit status 77 47/52 ESDM seed entropy - Sched ES, FIPS	CKID	0.15
exit status 77	SKIP	0.12
48/52 System call getrandom	ок	0.55
49/52 RPC call get random bytes full test	OK	0.73
50/52 RPC call get random bytes min test	OK	0.80
51/52 RPC call get_random_bytes_test	OK	0.71
52/52 RPC call status_test	OK	0.54
0k: 50		
Expected Fail: 0		
Fail: 0		
Unexpected Pass: 0		
Skipped: 2 Timeout: 0		
Timeout: 0		

ESDM - Resources

- Code / Tests / Documentation: https://github.com/smuellerDD/esdm
- Testing conducted with
 - FIPS mode
 - Without FIPS mode
 - With SELinux enabled
 - Without SELinux
 - Production use

SDM library version: 0.5.0 DRNG name: builtin SP800-90A Hash DRBG ESDM security strength in bits: 256 Number of DRNG instances: 8 Standards compliance: NTG.1 ESDM minimally seeded: true ESDM fullv seeded: true ESDM entropy level: 520 Entropy Source 0 properties: Name: Interrupt disabled - missing kernel support Entropy Source 1 properties: Name: Scheduler disabled - missing kernel support Entropy Source 2 properties: Name: JitterRNG Available entropy: 256 Library version: 3040000 Entropy Source 3 properties: Name: CPU Hash for compressing data: N/A Available entropy: 8 Data multiplier: 1 Entropy Source 4 properties: Name: KernelRNG Available entropy: 128 Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128 Entropy Source 5 properties: Name: LinuxHWRand Available entropy: 128 Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128 Entropy Source 6 properties: Name: Auxiliarv Hash for operating entropy pool: builtin SHA-512 Available entropy: 0

cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/esdm type ESDM library version: 0.5.0 DRNG name: builtin SP800-90A Hash DRBG ESDM security strength in bits: 256 Number of DRNG instances: 19 Standards compliance: SP800-90C NTG.1 ESDM minimally seeded: true ESDM fully seeded: true ESDM entropy level: 1352 Entropy Source 0 properties: Name: Interrupt Hash for operating entropy pool: sha512 Available entropy: 960 per-CPU interrupt collection size: 1024 Standards compliance: SP800-90B High-resolution timer: true Continuous compression: true Entropy Source 1 properties: Name: Scheduler Hash for operating entropy pool: sha512 Available entropy: 0 per-CPU scheduler event collection size: 1024 Standards compliance: SP800-90B High-resolution timer: true Entropy Source 2 properties: Name: JitterRNG Available entropy: 256 Library version: 3040000 Entropy Source 3 properties: Name: CPU Hash for compressing data: N/A Available entropy: 8 Data multiplier: 1 Entropy Source 4 properties: Name: KernelRNG Available entropy: 0 Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 0 Entropy Source 5 properties: Name: LinuxHWRand Available entropy: 128 Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128 Entropy Source 6 properties: Name: Auxiliary Hash for operating entropy pool: builtin SHA-512 Available entropy: 0