# Entropy Source and DRNG Manager ...or /dev/random in User Space

Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>

#### Agenda

- ESDM Goals
- ESDM Design
- Initial Seeding Strategies
- Entropy Sources


#### **ESDM Goals**

- Full user space implementation
  - No kernel changes needed only if scheduler ES is requested
  - Independent of political games of developers
- API and ABI compliant drop-in replacement of Linux /dev/random, /dev/urandom and getrandom(2)
- Minimal dependencies on environment
  - Protobuf-c
  - FUSE / CUSE support
- Runs fully unprivileged
- Sole use of cryptography for data processing
- Flexible configuration supporting wide range of use cases
- Standards compliance: SP800-90A/B/C, AIS 20/31, FIPS IG 7.19 / D.K (use of DRBG as conditioner)

```
ps -efa | grep esdm
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-server -f
root
             891
                       1 2 23:34 ?
             939
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-server -f
Inobody
                     891 0 23:34 ?
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-cuse-random -f
nobody
            1050
                       1 0 23:34 ?
            1051
                       1 0 23:34 ?
                                           00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-cuse-urandom -f
Inobody
                                            00:00:00 /usr/local/bin/esdm-proc --relabel -f -o allow other /proc/sys/kernel/random
nobody
            1054
                       1 0 23:34 ?
```


#### **ESDM** Design

- 7 Entropy Sources
  - 5 external
  - 2 internal
  - All ES treated equally
  - No domination by any ES seeding triggered by initialization process or DRNG
- All ES can be selectively disabled at compile time
- ES data fed into DRNG
- DRNG accessible with APIs



#### **ESDM Components**

- ESDM Server
  - Using ESDM library
  - Offering RPC Interface
  - Protobuf-C RPC
  - Sensitive operations require privilege
- ESDM RPC library
  - API for other clients
- /dev/random CUSE
- /dev/urandom CUSE
- /proc/sys/kernel/random FUSE
- libesdm-getrandom.so



#### **DRNG Output APIs**

- Blocking APIs deliver data only after fully initialized and fully seeded
  - When Linux compliant interfaces enabled:
    - /dev/random
    - getrandom() system call
- Prediction Resistance API deliver data only after fully initialized and successful reseed returning at most data equal to the amount of entropy
  - ESDM RPC client API
  - Using /dev/random with O\_SYNC
  - Using getrandom(2) with flag GRND RANDOM
  - Compliant with:
    - FIPS IG 7.19 / D.K to use DRBG as conditioning component for seeding other DRBGs
    - German AIS 20/31 (2011 and draft 2022) NTG.1 requirements
- Get seed: getrandom(2) with flag GRND\_SEED to obtain data from entropy sources directly
- All other APIs deliver data without blocking until complete initialization
  - No guarantee of ESDM being fully initialized / seeded

#### **DRNG** Seeding

- Temporary seed buffer: concatenation of output from all ES
- Seeding during initialization: when 256 bits of entropy are available
- Seeding at runtime
  - After 2<sup>20</sup> generate requests or 10 minutes
  - After forced reseed by user space
  - After new DRNG is loaded
  - At least 128 bits (SP800-90C mode: ESDM security strength) of total entropy must be available
  - 256 bits of entropy requested from each ES ES may deliver less
  - Seed operation occurs when DRNG is requested to produce random bits
  - DRNG returns to not fully seeded when last seed with full entropy was > 230 generate operations ago

```
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_seed_work_one:361]: reseed triggered by system events for DRNG on NUMA node 1
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_jent.c:esdm_jent_get:122]: obtained 256 bits of entropy from Jitter RNG noise source
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_cpu.c:esdm_cpu_get:230]: obtained 8 bits of entropy from CPU RNG entropy source
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_krng.c:esdm_krng_get:243]: obtained 128 bits of entropy from kernel RNG noise source
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - Entropy Source [../esdm/esdm_es_aux.c:esdm_aux_get_pool:319]: obtained 0 bits by collecting 0 bits of entropy from aux pool, 0 bits of entropy remaining
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm_drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:280]: seeding regular DRNG with 272 bytes
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:290]: regular DRNG fully seeded
ESDM (22:00:20) (esdm-server) Debug - DRNG [../esdm/esdm drng_mgr.c:esdm_drng_inject:2310]: regular DRNG fully seeded
```

### Initial Seeding Strategy I Default Operation

- DRNG is fully seeded with 256 bits of entropy
- Blocking interfaces released after DRNG is fully seeded
  - After 5 requests received, forced seeding with available entropy to achieve fully seeded level
- Default applied
  - Either no specific seeding strategy compiled
  - Or specific seeding strategy is not enabled at start time

### Initial Seeding Strategy II Entropy Source Oversampling

- Fully seeded step changed
- Compile time option
  - Function only enabled in FIPS mode
  - Function only enabled if message digest of conditioner >= 384 bits
- Initial conditioning: s + 64 bit
- Initial DRNG seeding: every entropy source requested for s + 128 bits
  - Every ES alone could provide all required entropy
- All ES data concatenated into seed buffer
- Runtime debug mode: display of all processing steps
- SP800-90C compliance:
  - SP800-90A DRBG with 256-bit strength / SHA-512 vetted conditioning component
  - Complies with RBG2(NP) per default
  - Can be configured to provide RBG2(P)
- Can be used in parallel with seeding strategy III

## Initial Seeding Strategy III Two Entropy Sources

- Initial / minimal seeding steps apply unaltered fully seeded step changed
- Compile time option
  - Function only enabled with compile option "ais2031"
- Initial DRNG seeding: two entropy sources must deliver 220 bits of entropy each
- All ES data concatenated into seed buffer
- Runtime debug mode: display of all processing steps
- German AIS 20/31 compliance
  - Caveat: Applies to draft version of AIS20/31 as of September 2022
  - NTG.1: LRNG configuration ensures two entropy sources can reach at least 220 bits each
  - PTG.3 / DRG.4: LRNG can be configured to provide a PTG.3 or DRG.4
- Can be used in parallel with seeding strategy II


When enabling this option, two entropy sources must deliver 220 bits of entropy each to consider a DRNG as fully seeded. Any two entropy sources can be used to fulfill this requirement. If specific entropy sources shall not be capable of contributing to this seeding strategy, the respective entropy source must be configured to provide less than 220 bits of entropy.

The strategy is consistent with the requirements for NTG.1 compliance in German AIS 20/31 draft from 2022 and is only enforced with lrng es mgr.ntgl=1.

Compliance with German AIS 20/31 from 2011 is always present when using /dev/random with the flag O\_SYNC or getrandom(2) with GRND\_RANDOM.

#### **DRNG** Management

- One DRNG per CPU up to maximum of 64
- Hash contexts on stack only
- Each DRNG initializes from entropy sources
- Sequential initialization of DRNG first is CPU 0
- If one DRNG node is not yet fully seeded → use of DRNG(Node 0)
- Each DRNG instance managed independently
- To prevent reseed storm reseed threshold different for each node
  - Node 0: 600 seconds
  - Node 1: 700 seconds
  - ...
- Maximum node number is compile time option




Option for: THREADING MAX THREADS

#### Data Processing Primitives

- Sole use of cryptographic mechanisms for data compression
- Cryptographic primitives compile-time switchable
  - DRNG, Conditioning hash
  - Built-in: SP800-90A Hash DRBG SHA2-512 / SHA2-512
  - Available:
    - ChaCha20 DRNG
    - SP800-90A Hash DRBG SHA3-512
    - SHA3-512 conditioning function
    - · Well-defined API to allow other cryptographic primitive implementations
- Complete cryptographic primitive testing available
  - Full ACVP test harness available: https://github.com/smuellerDD/acvpparser
  - ChaCha20 DRNG userspace implementation: https://github.com/smuellerDD/leancrypto
- Other data processing primitives
  - Concatenation of data
  - Truncation of message digest to heuristic entropy value
- Entropy behavior of all data processing primitives based on fully understood and uncontended operations

#### External Entropy Sources


- Use without additional conditioning fast source
  - Jitter RNG
  - Kernel RNG
  - CPU (e.g. Intel RDSEED, POWER DARN, RISC-V CSRRW, IBM Z PRNO)
    - Proper oversampling as defined by specification
  - Data immediately available when ESDM requests it
- Additional conditioning slow source
  - RNGDs
  - Arbitrary writers to /dev/random
  - All received data added to "auxiliary pool" with hash update operation
  - Data "trickles in" over time
- Every entropy source has individual entropy estimate
  - Taken at face value each ES requires its own entropy assessment



#### Mean Duration in Cycles for one IRQ


#### Internal ES: Interrupts

- Interrupt timing
  - All interrupts are treated as one entropy source
- Data collection executed in IRQ context
- Data compression executed partially in IRQ and process context
- Data compression is a hash update operation
- High performance: up to twice as fast as legacy /dev/random in IRQ context with continuous enabled
  - Even faster without continuous compression
- Kernel RNG lost acces to its primary IRQ ES → ESDM reseeds kernel RNG periodically
- Requires small kernel patch + kernel module
  - Code present in FSDM source tree



### Internal ES: IRQ Data Processing

- 8 LSB of time stamp divided by GCD concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
  - Entropy estimate
  - Health test
- 32 bits of other event data concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
- When array full → conditioned into per-CPU entropy pool
  - When entropy is required → conditioning of all entropy pools into one message digest
  - Addition of all per-CPU entropy estimates




#### Internal ES: Scheduler Events


- Scheduler-based context switch timing
  - All context switches are treated as one entropy source
- Data collection executed in scheduler context
  - Collection: adding data into collection array → high-performance (couple of cycles)
- Data compression executed in process context during reseeding of DRNG
- Data compression is a hash operation
- Requires small kernel patch + kernel module
  - Code present in ESDM source tree

Internal ES: Scheduler

**Data Processing** 

- 8 LSB of time stamp divided by GCD concatenated into per-CPU collection pool
  - Entropy estimate
  - Health test
- When array full → overwriting of oldest value
- When entropy is required → conditioning of all entropy pools into one message digest
  - Addition of all per-CPU entropy estimates





### Internal ES Testing Interfaces

- Testing code is compile time option
- Access via DebugFS
- Testing supports data collection at boot time and runtime:
  - Raw unprocessed entropy time stamps for Scheduler / IRQ ES
  - Performance data for ESDM's Scheduler handler
  - Performance data for ESDM's IRQ handler
- Scheduler ES: Full SP800-90B assessment documentation yet pending
- IRQ ES: Full SP800-90B assessment available
- Raw entropy collection and analysis tools provided

Thurt Court	E 4	I c c · · ·
Test System	Entropy of	Sufficient
	1,000,000 Traces	Entropy
ARMv7 rev 5	1.9344	Y
ARMv7 rev 5	7.07088	Y
(Freescale i.MX53) <sup>22</sup>		
ARMv7 rev 5	6.638399	Y
(Freescale i.MX6 Ultralite) <sup>23</sup>		
ARM 64 bit AppliedMicro X-Gene	5.599128	Y
Mustang Board		
Intel Atom Z530 – using GUI	3.38584	Y
Intel i7 7500U Skylake - 64-bit KVM	3.452064	Y
environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake – 64-bit	7.400136	Y
KVM environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake – 32-bit	7.405704	Y
KVM environment		
Intel i7 8565U Whiskey Lake	6.871	Y
Intel Xeon Gold 6234	4.434168	Y
IBM POWER 8 LE 8286-42A	6.830712	Y
IBM POWER 7 BE 8202-E4C	4.233912	Y
IBM System Z z13 (machine 2964)	4.366368	Y
IBM System Z z15 (machine 8561)	5.691832	Y
MIPS Atheros AR7241 rev 1 <sup>24</sup>	7.157064	Y
MIPS Lantiq 34Kc V5.6 <sup>25</sup>	7.032740	Y
Qualcomm IPQ4019 ARMv7 <sup>26</sup>	6.638405	Y
SiFive HiFive Unmatched RISC-V U74	2.387470	Y

#### Internal ES Health Test

- Health test compile-time configurable
- Power-Up self tests
  - All cryptographic mechanisms
  - Time stamp management
- APT / RCT
- Time-Stamp Pattern detection: 1st/2nd/3rd discrete derivative of time ≠ 0
- Blocking interface: Wait until APT power-up testing complete
- Provides SP800-90B compliance of internal ES

#### **General Testing**

- Automated regression test suite covering the different options of ESDM
  - Meson test harness
- Applied testing frameworks
  - ASAN: address, thread, undefined
  - Valgrind memory leak detector
  - clang-scan
- Performance tests of DRNG
- Interface validation testing
- Compile test testing all options

```
: Entering directory `/home/sm/tmp/esdm-0.3.0/build'
                                                                             3.01s
3.01s
3.01s
3.01s
  /52 Read /dev/random - w/o ESDM server
  '52 Read /dev/urandom - w/o ESDM server
  /52 Write /dev/random - w/o ESDM server
  //52 Write /dev/urandom - w/o ESDM server
                                                                              0.039
 1/52 ESDM API call esdm status
32/52 ESDM API call esdm version
3/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes full
                                                                              0.209
4/52 ESDM API call esdm get random bytes
                                                                              0.24
                                                                              0.27
                           1ENT ES no ETPS
47/52 ESDM seed entropy - Sched ES, FIPS
                                                           SKIP
exit status 77
48/52 System call getrandom
49/52 RPC call get random bytes full test
<u>50/52 RPC call get random bytes min test</u>
51/52 RPC call get random bytes test
52/52 RPC call status test
Expected Fail:
Unexpected Pass:
```

#### **ESDM** - Resources

- Code / Tests / Documentation: https://github.com/smuellerDD/esdm
- Testing conducted with
  - FIPS mode
  - Without FIPS mode
  - With SELinux enabled
  - Without SELinux
  - Production use

```
SDM library version: 0.5.0
DRNG name: builtin SP800-90A Hash DRBG
ESDM security strength in bits: 256
Number of DRNG instances: 8
Standards compliance: NTG.1
ESDM minimally seeded: true
ESDM fully seeded: true
ESDM entropy level: 520
Entropy Source 0 properties:
 Name: Interrupt
disabled - missing kernel support
Entropy Source 1 properties:
 Name: Scheduler
disabled - missing kernel support
Entropy Source 2 properties:
 Name: JitterRNG
Available entropy: 256
Library version: 3040000
Entropy Source 3 properties:
Hash for compressing data: N/A
Available entropy: 8
Data multiplier: 1
Entropy Source 4 properties:
 Name: KernelRNG
Available entropy: 128
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128
Entropy Source 5 properties:
 Name: LinuxHWRand
Available entropy: 128
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128
Entropy Source 6 properties:
 Name: Auxiliarv
 Hash for operating entropy pool: builtin SHA-512
Available entropy: 0
```

```
cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/esdm type
ESDM library version: 0.5.0
DRNG name: builtin SP800-90A Hash DRBG
ESDM security strength in bits: 256
Number of DRNG instances: 19
Standards compliance: SP800-90C NTG.1
ESDM minimally seeded: true
ESDM fully seeded: true
ESDM entropy level: 1352
Entropy Source 0 properties:
Name: Interrupt
Hash for operating entropy pool: sha512
Available entropy: 960
per-CPU interrupt collection size: 1024
Standards compliance: SP800-90B
High-resolution timer: true
Continuous compression: true
Entropy Source 1 properties:
Name: Scheduler
Hash for operating entropy pool: sha512
Available entropy: 0
per-CPU scheduler event collection size: 1024
Standards compliance: SP800-90B
High-resolution timer: true
Entropy Source 2 properties:
Name: JitterRNG
Available entropy: 256
Library version: 3040000
Entropy Source 3 properties:
Name: CPU
Hash for compressing data: N/A
Available entropy: 8
Data multiplier: 1
Entropy Source 4 properties:
Name: KernelRNG
Available entropy: 0
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 0
Entropy Source 5 properties:
Name: LinuxHWRand
Available entropy: 128
Entropy Rate per 256 data bits: 128
Entropy Source 6 properties:
Name: Auxiliary
Hash for operating entropy pool: builtin SHA-512
Available entropy: 0
```